Defence Budget
The national defence budgets constitute the foundation of defence capability development. In Bulgaria, the defence budget is determined by national priorities and by commitments undertaken within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Bulgaria has gradually increased its defence spending in recent years. At the same time, the structure of expenditure has also improved, with nearly 30% of the defence budget in recent years allocated to major equipment and research and development (R&D).1
Defence expenditure reached 1.96% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024 and 2.13% of GDP in 2025.
The State Budget Act for 20262 allocated EUR 2.693 billion to defence expenditure, equivalent to 2.15% of gross domestic product (GDP). Beyond the annual budget, Bulgaria has established a longer-term framework for increasing defence spending. By Decision No. 448 of 11 June 20263, the Council of Ministers approved a National Plan for Increasing Defence Expenditure to 5% of GDP by 2035, in line with the commitments undertaken by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies at the 2025 Hague Summit. The plan envisages a gradual increase in defence spending, with at least 3.5% of GDP annually allocated to core defence requirements and NATO capability targets, and an additional 1.5% dedicated to broader defence- and security-related activities, including critical infrastructure protection, cyber defence, civil preparedness and resilience, innovation, and strengthening the defence industrial base. Within this framework, total capital expenditure over the 2026–2035 period, including funding under the European Union (EU) Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, is projected to reach EUR 19.12 billion.
The EU Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme is viewed as an important source of defence financing, with loan funding of EUR 3.26 billion allocated to Bulgaria. According to the government’s plan, these funds are intended to support key modernisation projects, including the construction of an ammunition and propellant production facility; the acquisition of air defence systems; procurement of 3D radars; the purchase of 155 mm howitzers; missiles for new naval vessels; and the acquisition of drones and counter-drone systems. According to the Ministry of Defence, SAFE funding was originally intended to complement the national defence budget and accelerate the acquisition of new capabilities. In practice, however, SAFE funds were calculated within the 2% of GDP framework.
Despite the significant increase in defence spending, the Bulgarian Armed Forces continue to face a number of structural and technological challenges. Although Bulgaria has been a NATO member since 2004, a large share of its capabilities remains based on weapons and equipment developed according to former Warsaw Pact standards, which are both physically and morally obsolete and incompatible with NATO forces.
To address these challenges, in 2023 the National Assembly approved the Programme for Investments in Defence until 2032. The programme outlines the capabilities that the country must develop, identifying 188 core capabilities. It is based on two defence-spending assumptions for 2% and 2.5% of GDP. The document explicitly notes that even if defence spending increases to 2.5% of GDP during the 2023–2032 period, “it will not be possible to compensate for the chronic underfunding of the Bulgarian Armed Forces over the past 30 years, and capital expenditure resources will not be sufficient for the comprehensive modernisation of the Armed Forces”.4
Overall, the Bulgarian Armed Forces enjoy a high level of public trust, and there is no significant societal opposition to defence modernisation expenditures. Political debates focus primarily on whether weapons and equipment should be procured from the United States or from European manufacturers, as well as on the extent to which the Bulgarian defence industry can participate in these projects.
Following the parliamentary elections held in Bulgaria on 19 April 2026, the political formation Progressive Bulgaria secured an absolute majority in the National Assembly, winning 131 of the 240 parliamentary seats (54.6%). This outcome provides a stronger parliamentary basis for political stability and greater continuity in defence policy. The new governing majority has declared its commitment to continuing the modernisation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, including the acquisition of modern equipment and the development of new defence capabilities. Nevertheless, the implementation of these priorities will depend on sustained defence investment and effective management of modernisation programmes. At the same time, longstanding challenges, particularly personnel shortages, capability gaps and the need to ensure the efficient use of defence resources, are likely to persist.
The most serious issue, however, is the deterioration of the security environment in the Black Sea. Commercial vessels have been struck in the exclusive economic zones and territorial waters of Bulgaria and Romania, significantly changing the regional security environment. This will affect modernisation plans.
Personnel
Bulgaria maintains a professional force model. According to strategic documents, the Bulgarian Armed Forces should consist of 40,000 professional service members and 3,000 volunteer reservists. The main challenge faced by the Ministry of Defence is the low level of interest in military service and the limited number of new recruits, combined with difficulties in retaining existing personnel. Personnel pressure remains high due to persistent recruitment and retention shortfalls. According to the 2024 Defence Report, the personnel shortfall among active service members stands at 21.8%, while the reserve is filled to only 16%.5
These shortages negatively affect the Armed Forces’ ability to perform their core functions. Contributing factors include adverse demographic trends, internal and external migration among younger groups, the geographical dislocation of major military units, and other structural issues. In addition, the war in Ukraine and ongoing political rhetoric regarding the possible deployment of Bulgarian troops to Ukraine may also have a deterrent effect on recruitment.
The government has adopted several measures to address these challenges, among them significant salary increases in 2024 and 2025, with a limited impact on recruitment so far. In 2025, military salaries were increased by 30%, which has led to some increase in recruitment interest; however, the number of applicants remains well below the required levels.
A more comprehensive analysis is required to identify measures that could fill vacant positions and make military service more attractive. In 2026, the Ministry of Defence established a Human Resources Council tasked with addressing the issue in a comprehensive manner by assessing the main factors affecting both recruitment and personnel retention.
Key measures include salary increases, recruitment initiatives, housing support and rent compensation, improved living conditions, employment opportunities for spouses, better access to schooling for children, clearer career development pathways, and broader personnel retention efforts.
The acquisition of modern weapons systems is expected to be one potential positive factor.
At present, the reintroduction of compulsory military service, which was abolished in 2007, is not being considered in Bulgaria.
Land Warfare
In 2010, based on the assessment that the risk of conventional war in Europe was low, the Ministry of Defence initiated a major transformation of the Land Forces. The focus shifted toward building light formations capable of rapid deployment in operations outside national territory. At the same time, major forces were redeployed to a limited number of locations, leaving large parts of the country without permanent military garrisons.
The war in Ukraine fundamentally altered this assessment, a shift reflected in subsequent force development concepts. The National Defence Strategy adopted in 2025 acknowledges the risk of global military and nuclear escalation, including the possibility of politico-economic and conventional confrontation and an accelerated arms race.6 It also highlights the growing importance of hybrid threats. The strategy concludes that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria must meet qualitatively new requirements in terms of readiness, modernisation, technological advancement, interoperability, and comprehensive support, with a primary focus on the mission of “Deterrence and Defence”.7
Bulgaria considers the protection of its national interests achievable primarily within collective frameworks such as NATO and the EU. Consequently, priority capability development is closely linked to NATO defence planning processes and commitments undertaken within the EU.
The Ministry of Defence intends to continue both ongoing and planned modernisation projects for the Land Forces. Bulgaria has signed a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement with the United States for the acquisition of 200 Stryker armoured vehicles as part of the modernisation of the Bulgarian Land Forces, and the contract is already under implementation.
Under the SAFE programme, funding is envisaged for the acquisition of 155 mm howitzers, HIMARS systems, transport vehicles, communications equipment, and other key military capabilities. The pace and scope of modernisation will depend on available budgetary resources, which must be distributed across all branches of the Armed Forces.
The main risks are related to securing sufficient funding for the implementation of all ongoing and planned modernisation projects. There is still uncertainty as to whether SAFE funding will be provided in addition to the national defence budget or counted within the established percentage of GDP allocated to defence spending.
At present, the Bulgarian defence industry is unable to participate fully in Land Forces modernisation, as it primarily produces weapons and ammunition based on former Warsaw Pact standards that are incompatible with NATO requirements. In 2025, however, a decision was taken to establish a 155 mm ammunition production facility in cooperation with Rheinmetall, which will also supply ammunition for the Bulgarian Army.
Drones
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the wide-ranging capabilities of different types of drones. Nevertheless, the concept for drone employment within the Bulgarian Armed Forces remains underdeveloped. Currently, lessons learned from the war in Ukraine are being analysed to determine future requirements and to assess how drones can be integrated into units at the tactical and operational levels.
Doctrine integration remains low to medium, as drones are not yet fully incorporated into operational concepts, training, and force structures. Bulgaria’s drone industry should currently be assessed as emerging. A comprehensive concept for the employment of drones across tactical and operational-level units still needs to be developed.
To date, drones have been procured only for the Land Forces, primarily Class I micro and Class I small systems used for reconnaissance and communications.
Bulgaria plans to include drone and counter-drone capabilities among the projects financed under the SAFE programme. The prevailing view is that building large stockpiles of drones is not cost-effective due to the rapid pace of technological development. Instead, the priority is to develop domestic production capacity. For this reason, Bulgaria is seeking partnerships with European companies to establish drone production facilities in the country, although the procurement of certain classes of drones from foreign suppliers is not excluded.
Bulgarian thinking on drones is based on several key assumptions. Drones are generally considered more effective in static conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, whereas their effectiveness may be more limited in high-tempo operations. At the same time, drone technologies evolve rapidly, making the development of domestic production capacity more rational than stockpiling systems that quickly become obsolete. In addition, electric batteries have relatively short lifespans.
This understanding led to a decision to task the state-owned company Sofia Tech Park with conducting a survey of Bulgarian companies interested in producing various types of drones according to Ministry of Defence specifications. These include: (1) Class I micro and Class I mini drones for tactical aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, including detection, identification, target acquisition, and target designation; (2) strike drones; (3) logistics drones; (4) tactical demining and mining drones; (5) firefighting drones; and (6) cargo drones for a range of operational and tactical transport tasks.
At present, several Bulgarian companies are developing and mastering the production of specific types of drones. The most prominent among them is Dronamics, a Bulgaria-based company with more than 11 years of experience in the in-house design, manufacturing, and operation of large unmanned aerial systems for civil and dual-use applications. Other Bulgarian companies have developed drone prototypes, largely using foreign components and know-how, but are awaiting concrete interest from the Ministry of Defence before scaling up production. Following the Sofia Tech Park survey, additional domestic manufacturers may emerge and potentially receive orders both for the Bulgarian Armed Forces and for external markets.
As a Black Sea country, Bulgaria should also consider acquiring and employing maritime drone capabilities; however, at this stage, such initiatives remain conceptual. Fleet modernisation continues to focus primarily on the construction of modern patrol vessels, based on concepts approved more than a decade ago. Despite the lessons from the war in Ukraine, the adoption of new operational concepts and the acquisition of new capabilities remain time-consuming processes, highlighting the need for fundamental change at both national and allied levels.
Notes & sources
NATO. 2025. Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2025). https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/finance/def-exp-2025-en.pdf.
↩State Budget Act for 2026 (Закон за държавния бюджет на Република България за 2026 г.). https://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/showMaterialDV.jsp?idMat=245041
↩National Plan for Increasing Defence Expenditure to 5% of the Gross Domestic Product of the Republic of Bulgaria by 2035. https://www.strategy.bg/bg/strategy-documents/1795
↩Ministry of Finance Bulgaria. 2025. Програма за инвестиции в отбраната до 2032г. // Defense Investment Program until 2032. https://www.mod.bg/documents/6899d66f72600_priemane_Programa_za_investitsii_v_otbranata_2032.pdf. p.9.
↩Government of Bulgaria. 2024. Докладът за състоянието на отбраната и въоръжените сили на Република България за 2024 г. // Report on the State of the Defense and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. https://pris.government.bg/document/94100c4446e6a0c362ae30b51490ae31. p.7.
↩Ministry of Defence Bulgaria. 2025. Национална отбранителна стратегия на Република България // National Defence strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria. https://www.mod.bg/doc/strategicheski/20250324_Natsioanalna_otbranitelna_strategia_RMS_131_06.03.2025.pdf. p.4.
↩Ibid, p.7.
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Bulgaria · Yordan Bozhilov · EDINA V
