Italy

Defence Budget

The NATO spending targets have been central in the public discussion in an unprecedented way. They have been on the political agenda not only of the Defence Minister, but also of the Foreign Minister and – above all – of the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. The integrated defence budget, which include the Ministry of Defence budget and other government funding for military operations and defence procurement, rose from 32.3 billion euro in 2024 to 35,5 billion euro in 2025 and is projected to reach 35,9 and 36,6 billion respectively in 2026 and 2027.¹

At the same time, the Meloni government has decided to change the accounting for other budgetary lines as allowed by NATO parameters. As a result, the defence budget notified to NATO and accepted by the Alliance in 2025 is 45,3 billion euro, that equals to 2% of Italian GDP, but no details are available on such new accounting.² This figure is set to grow to 47 and 48.2 billion euro respectively in 2026 and 2027³.

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Italy did not asked for the National Escape Clause from the EU Stability and Growth Pact, also because the Italian deficit in 2025 continued to decreased but remained still slightly above 3% GDP threshold allowed by the Pact.

The Meloni government has rather requested in 2025 14,9 billion euro loans through the SAFE programme launched by the EU.⁴ Their addition to the gradual increase of the integrated defence budget makes it possible for Italy to reach 2,5% GDP spending on defence by 2030.⁵ This is still a long way from the goal of 3.5% by 2035 which is the benchmark of the national agenda.

The Ministry of Defence’s 2025 multiannual programming document (Documento Programmatico Pluriennale per la Difesa - DPP) has a three-year horizon. Accordingly, the current DPP, issued in 2025, plans investments from 2025 to 2027. However, it is not legally binding and recent years have shown a certain flexibility on the implementation of provisions beyond the DPP year of adoption. The negative economic effects of the US-Israel war against Iran cast doubts on the Italian GDP growth in 2026 and on the need to shift public resources to support the Italian society vis-a-vis rising inflation. Therefore, the reliability of the budget planning is medium as the decisions already taken are exposed to political and budget risks. Indeed, because of Iran in recent months a strong public debate rose on the defence spending. As of 20^th May 2026, no decision has been taken with respect to previous commitments. The next DPP is expected in the second half of 2026.

Concerning implementation, according to the DPP growing investments are spread over the years and on many procurement programmes aimed at satisfying the needs of the three armed forces. For the Army, main battle tanks, armoured combat system, artillery (1,8 billions), attack helicopters (1,2 billion) ammunition and logistics are among the spending priority. The Navy is investing heavily on 2 FREMM frigates (2 billion), and 2 U212FNS submarines (1,3 billion). The Air Force got the budget to acquire 24 additional Eurofighter (7,5 billion) and to fund with 8,8 billion the Research and Development (R&D) for the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). At joint level, 779 million euro have been allocated in 2026 to the acquisition of SAMP/T NG and the production of missiles.⁶ In the space domain, the DPP funds the acquisition of SICRAL3 satellite for military satcom. The 14,9 billion of SAFE loans are likely to be distributed across several existing programmes to accelerate and/or increase their delivery, as they provide a ready-available tool for timely spending.

Personnel

In the 2025 there has been a wider and more intense public debate on military personnel than in the previous two decades. Various options have been discussed, including on a reserve force, while surveys have showed a strong reluctance by the electorate to re-start the conscription suspended by Italy back in 1999. According to the 2025 DPP, in 2026 the military personnel encompassing army, air force and navy amounts to 167.352 units (plus 20.374 civilian personnel in the MoD). According to the pre-2022 plans, this number was set to steady decrease. The law presented by the government on December 2025 establish the number of active-duty military personnel at 160.000 by 2033⁷ aiming for a more balanced force. The 2025 law also envisages several concrete measures to increase recruitment and retention, including by rising the age ceiling for certain roles. The law also integrates the military medical corps from single services to the joint level. Beyond that, no decisions have been taken neither on conscription, nor on reserve or on civilian personnel in the defence sector. Italy currently maintains a very limited reserve force around 1.000 units made up of retired military personnel as well as of selected civilians i.e. with medical, logistics, legal or organization expertise. The number of applications for both army and navy vacancies have decreased in recent years, by demonstrating a constraint on the pool of possible resources in the current circumstances. Overall, the pressure on the military personnel is medium, as there is a need for more and younger human resources but the armed forces still maintain a certain balance and effectiveness.

Land Warfare

According to the DPP 2025, the three top priorities for the land component are: 1) ammunition; 2) heavy armour and long-range fires; 3) massive adoption of drones. The three flagship programmes in this area are: Main Battle Tanks (MBT); armoured combat vehicles; 155 millimetres artillery. Italy has taken the major decision to renew its Main Battle Tank (MBT) fleet by procuring 132 next generation platforms to be developed and produced by the joint venture established between Leonardo and Rheinmetall, with an investment of 5,51 billion euro spread until 2038; meanwhile, 125 in-service MBT Ariete will be upgraded as gap-filler.⁸ The MoD also launched the procurement for Army Armoured Combat Vehicles (A2CV) by signing the contract for the first 21 platforms with the same joint venture: the whole A2CV programme envisages the acquisition of 1050 vehicles, for a total of 15 billion euro – including 8,4 billion already earmarked.⁹ As for 155-mm artillery, 1,8 billion are envisaged for 66 new systems.

There are two main drivers for these MoD choices, which take place within the perimeter of NATO targets to strengthen Europe’s deterrence and defence posture vis-à-vis Russia. On the one hand, legacy replacement: the dire necessity to replace obsolete platforms like Ariete and at the same time upgrade, enhance and expand the whole family of tracked and wheeled vehicles, particularly the heavy and medium ones. However, there is no perceived urgency to do so, as demonstrated by the long timeline set for the procurement programmes. Here comes the second driver, industrial policy: to boost the DTIB land sector by long term MoD investments coupled with a European joint venture and a domestic consolidation. Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto places high priority on defence industrial policy, in the land sector as in others, and aims to leverage the spike of military spending at Italian and EU levels to increase national technological edge and production capacity. Such rationale prevails over other considerations on comparative advantage and specialisation - which would have rather encouraged Italy to acquire a customized Leopard for the army - and are not much informed by the decisions of other NATO/EU allies. As such, they confirm that Italy perceives Russia as growing threat for NATO but not an imminent one, and that Meloni government balances two equal priorities: to increase military readiness against a near-peer adversary as agreed within NATO and EU, and to boost domestic DTIB to achieve greater operational and technological autonomy. The degree of multinational cooperation as whole is medium, as the risk on its implementation particularly when it comes to the timeline for the deliveries.

Drones

On average, the role of different drone types within Italian armed forces is rather limited, but it is both changing and growing. In particular, the Air Force prioritizes crewed aircraft, and is working mainly to develop and acquire advanced UCAS (the so-called “adjuncts”) within the GCAP as part of a system-of-systems centred on a 6^th generation fighter¹⁰. The Navy is keen to acquire aerial, surface and underwater drones, and it is changing its doctrine and posture in order to move towards crewed warships as “mother carrier” of a variety of drones. Currently the Navy deploys some aerial drones, and has invested in R&D for underwater ones trough the National Hub on the Underwater Dimension established in 2023 in La Spezia.¹¹ The Army has identified important lessons from Russia-Ukraine conflict, including the need to shift towards a “drone-centric warfare” according to its chief Carmine Masiello.¹² Actually the Army has an urgent need to procure a variety of drones on a large scale, as well as to train their operators at all levels, but at the same time it faces major difficulties including in terms of regulations, procurement and logistics. As a whole across the three services, the operational use of drones is limited, and their doctrine integration is still medium and work in progress.

Broadly speaking, while Air Force and Navy lean towards experimentation and tailored acquisition in relation to major platforms such as aircraft or warships, the Army leans toward procurement and logistics solutions centred on operational deployment. In any case, the role of drones has changed for all the armed forces: from one limited to ISR to a broader role encompassing engagement and/or combat, primarily for aerial drones but also for underwater, surface and – in the future - for ground drones. As for procurement procedures, unfortunately no changes took place since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, and the peace-time regulatory and organizational framework struggles to cope with the fast pace of drone innovation and production.

Italy produces drones in a limited way. In the past, prime contractors like Leonardo and Fincantieri have been lagging behind on drone production, by slowing down the whole supply chain and national Defence Technological Industrial Base (DTIB) in this regard. This situation has recently evolved. In 2025 Leonardo has established a joint venture with the Turkish company Baykar in order to catch up on drones and leverage the synergies between the two enterprises¹³, while in the same year Fincantieri has demonstrated its underwater drone DEEP at La Spezia.¹⁴ Beyond these two main companies, many Italian SMEs and start-ups are also developing and/or producing drones, mostly aerial ones. However, the domestic drone industry remains emerging, and not enough well-structured in comparison with (i) the urgent and wide demand by the three armed services and (ii) the growth potential of the Italian DTIB.